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Abstract
We revisit the phenomenon that group decisions diﬀer systematically
from decisions of individuals. Our experiment solicits individual and
group decisions from the same subjects in two settings, gift-exchange
games and lottery choices. With no deliberation and voting, the group
decision is determined by the median individual decision, without a shift.
With deliberation but no imposed decision rule, the individual one po-
sition towards the selﬁsh direction also becomes inﬂuential. In lottery
choices we ﬁnd no group shift relative to the median. We demonstrate
that the standard practice of comparing means of group and individual
decisions would incorrectly identify a level shift.
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11 Introduction
Many important decisions in the society are made by groups of individuals such
as committees, governing bodies, juries, business partners, teams, and families.
Experiments in various contexts demonstrate systematic diﬀerences between
choices made by groups of individuals and by individuals making decisions in
isolation. There is a large literature in social psychology documenting and an-
alyzing this phenomenon, referring to it as the “discontinuity eﬀect” or “group
shift”, and a relatively recent literature in economics investigating it both ex-
perimentally and theoretically.1
Some of the experiments feature tasks in which there is a normative criterion
for evaluating the quality of the decisions. Laughlin (1980) and Laughlin and
Ellis (1986) refer to these tasks as intellective.2 In these situations it is natu-
ral to expect the distribution of groups’ decisions to diﬀer systematically from
the distribution of individual decisions if group members can interact with each
other, since group members can convey information to each other that ratio-
nally changes the intended action of the others.3 More surprising is the ﬁnding
that there is a group shift in many non-intellective tasks, in particular when
only the decision-makers’ personal preferences should dictate choice. There is a
large literature examining attitudes towards cooperation and reciprocity, mostly
concluding that people in groups act more selﬁshly than when they make de-
cisions individually (“selﬁsh shift”).4 Another line of literature, starting with
Stoner (1961), investigates risk attitudes expressed by groups and individuals
diﬀering.5 In most choice problems involving a safe and a risky option groups
tend to take more risk (“risky shifts”), but in some types of lottery decisions
the opposite is observed (“cautious shifts”).6
The two main general explanations in social psychology for such shifts are
the social comparison theory (Levinger and Schneider, 1969) and the persuasive
1In social psychology, the topic became a standard textbook chapter: see for example
Brown (1986), chapter 6.
2Within intellective tasks Gigone and Hastie (1993) deﬁne highly demonstratable ones
as those for which arguments prescribed by the normative model are self-evidently correct,
making it very likely that the correct arguments win in a discussion.
3Even if no communication is possible before the decision-making mechanism, if the latter
involves sequentiality (like sequential voting) group members can learn information from each
other during the mechanism.
4In the prisoner’s dilemma context this conclusion is reached by Pylyshyn et al. (1966),
Wolosin et al. (1975), Lindskold et al. (1977), Rabbie (1982), Insko et al. (1990), and
Schopler and Insko (1992). Wildschut et al. (2003) contains a meta-analysis of the subject.
In centipede games Bornstein et al. (2004), while in ultimatum games Robert and Carnevale
(1997) and Bornstein and Yanive (1998) report similar ﬁndings. In gift-exchange games,
Kocher and Sutter (2007) ﬁnd no diﬀerence between groups and individuals if giving a gift
is relatively cheap and unlimited discussion is allowed within groups, but show that groups
are more selﬁsh if group members can only communicate anonymously, through the computer
network. In dictator games Cason and Mui (1997) report an altruistic shift, but Luhan et al.
(2009) in a modiﬁed design ﬁnd a selﬁsh shift.
5See also Teger and Pruitt (1967), Burnstein et al. (1973), and Brown (1974).
6As Hong (1978) demonstrates, the cultural setting can also inﬂuence the direction of the
shift in the same decision problem.
2argument theory (Burnstein et al., 1973; Brown, 1974).7 The social compari-
son theory emphasizes that people in group settings behave diﬀerently than in
isolation. In particular, it assumes that people are motivated both to perceive
and present themselves in a socially desirable way. To accomplish this, a per-
son might react in a way that is closer to what he regards as the social norm
than how he would act in isolation. According to the persuasive argument the-
ory, the reason why deliberation drives group decisions in a particular direction
is that the pool of arguments in that direction is more persuasive. A related
explanation of group shifts is that people with certain preferences tend to be
more persuasive than others (for example, more selﬁsh individuals are also more
aggressive in deliberation).
In this paper we provide an experimental investigation of group shifts in
the context of non-intellective tasks, and examine both the social comparison
theory and the persuasive argument theory. The main methodological point we
make is that the question whether there is a systematic shift in the behavior
of people in group settings can only be addressed relative to some benchmark
hypothesis on how individual preferences are aggregated into group decisions.
For example, it is well-known that if individuals have single-peaked preferences
and employ majority voting in their decisions then the group decision is equal
to the median of the group members’ decisions (Moulin, 1980). Then if the
distribution of individual preferences in a subject pool is asymmetric, so that
the population median is not equal to the population mean, there is an expected
shift in the direction of the population median when one compares the average
of individual decisions to the average of group decisions, even if there is no
change of behavior in social settings. This is an important observation because
most of the existing literature on group shift bases its conclusions on comparing
average group decisions to average individual decisions.8 We are only aware of
one paper showing that deliberation causes a group shift relative to the initial
median individual opinion in the group, in the context of an intellective task:
Schkade et al. (2000) demonstrate this in an experiment in which subjects need
to decide an appropriate punitive damage award in a case of recklessly negligent
behavior.9
We conducted our investigation in two contexts. The ﬁrst one is the gift-
exchange game of Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), widely studied in ex-
perimental economics. In this context we looked at decisions as a respondent
(second-mover), made by groups and by individuals consisting these groups.
The decision problem of the respondent, namely how much gift to reciprocate,
is a non-intellective task if there is no continuation in the interaction between
the ﬁrst-mover and the second-mover. It should purely reﬂect how much the
decision-maker feels compelled to reciprocate gifts by others. Existing stud-
7See other explanations, mostly in speciﬁc types of decision problems, in the next section.
8There is even a line of literature exploring the relationship between the mean of individual
decisions and the mean of group decisions across diﬀerent speciﬁcations of lottery choice
problems (Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Myers and Arenson, 1972).
9In particular, deliberation causes a systematic increase in the punitive damage award
chosen by the group, relative to the median of individual opinions.
3ies suggest that with respect to reciprocity the distribution of preferences in a
typical subject pool is asymmetric: based on data from ultimatum games and
repeated public good contribution games, several papers drew the conclusion
that typically roughly 40% of subjects reciprocate others’ contributions to var-
ious degrees, while 50-60% of the subjects seem to care only about their own
material payoﬀs.10 This implies that the population median is at the selﬁsh
extreme, and in particular the median decision in related contexts is diﬀerent
(more selﬁsh) than the average decision.
The second setting we examined is binary choices between lotteries, based
on the risk preference elicitation questionnaire of Holt and Laury (2002). This
type of decision problem is again typically considered to be a non-intellective
task, reﬂecting the subject’s attitudes towards risk-taking.
To compare individual and group decisions, we implemented a design in
which some subjects were randomly allocated to be individual decision-makers,
while other subjects were allocated to groups of ﬁve. In gift-exhange games,
individual decision-makers played the roles of the ﬁrst movers, and subjects al-
located to groups played the roles of the second movers. In every gift-exchange
game, after the amount of gift from the ﬁrst mover was revealed to group mem-
bers, ﬁrst we solicited how much the group members would reciprocate individ-
ually, and then the group decision. For each of these decisions it was randomly
determined whether the group choice was implemented, or one of the individual
choices, and if the latter, which one. In both cases, the eﬀective group choice
inﬂuenced all group members’ payoﬀs identically (even if it happened to be one
of the group members’ individual decision). Similarly, in lottery choices ﬁrst we
solicited individual choices of group members, and then group decisions, with
the understanding that it was randomly determined whether one of the indi-
vidual decisions or the group decision would become the actual lottery choice,
but in both cases the same decision would apply to all group members. As far
as we know our experiment is the ﬁrst in which both the group decision and
the intended individual decisions of the group members were solicited for the
same decision and monetary incentives were provided for both types of choices.
There are studies, like Cason and Mui (1997) and Luhan et al. (2009), in which
both individual and group decisions are solicited from the same subjects for the
same type of decision, but in these studies individual decisions only apply to
the individual itself.11 Given that we examine decision problems in which social
preferences matter, we ﬁnd it important that the individual and group decisions
apply to the same set of people. Another aspect in which our experiments diﬀer
from the ones featured in the above studies is that having groups of ﬁve indi-
viduals allows us to examine the inﬂuence of nonmedian group members closer
versus further away from the median, on the group decision.12
10See Ledyard (1995), Palfrey and Prisbey (1997), Brandts and Schram (2001), and Fis-
chbacher et al. (2001). The data we collected in the experiments for Ambrus and Pathak
(2007) is also consistent with these ﬁndings.
11Furthermore, in the cited studies, groups interact with groups, while individuals interact
with individuals.
12Cason and Mui (1997) investigated groups of two individuals, while and Luhan et al.
4We conducted two diﬀerent treatments. In the benchmark, No Deliberation,
group members were not allowed to deliberate on the choice, and the group de-
cision was determined by a sequential public voting mechanism. This treatment
ruled out the possibility of a group shift arising from asymmetric preference ag-
gregation such as in the persuasive argument theory. However, since the voting
procedure was publicly observed by group members, it left open the possibility
that group members acted diﬀerently in the group setting than when making
their individual decisions, as in the social comparison theory. In the alternative
treatment, Deliberation, we allowed for unrestricted deliberation among group
members before agreeing upon a group decision (after all of them submitted
their individual decisions secretly), hence allowed for the possibility that cer-
tain individuals aﬀect the group decision more than others. Moreover, similarly
to most studies of group decisions, in this treatment we did not impose a voting
mechanism, and left it completely to the groups to decide on how they come up
with a group decision.
The primary focus of our empirical investigation is on the gift-exchange
games, where the larger action space and the larger spread of individual decisions
allowed us a more elaborate testing of which group members were inﬂuential
in shaping group decisions than in binary lottery choice problems. Based on
regressing the group decision on the ordered (from lowest to highest) individual
decisions by the group members, we tested three formal hypotheses. The ﬁrst
one is that the group decision is a function of the mean of individual decisions,
as implicitly or explicitly assumed by most of the literature. This hypothesis
implies that all individuals within a group should have the same regression
coeﬃcient, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The second one is that the group
decision is a function of the median decision: in this case only the median
group member (the third lowest individual decision) should have a regression
coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The third hypothesis is that there
is a group shift corresponding to a level eﬀect when subjects make the group
decision: in this case the regression coeﬃcient for the constant term should be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (negative for a selﬁsh shift), independently of
how diﬀerent individual decisions get aggregated into a group decision.13
In the No Deliberation treatment, the only signiﬁcant parameter in the re-
gression (at the 1% level) is the median group member’s individual contribution.
The mean hypothesis is strongly rejected, while the median hypothesis cannot
be rejected. The coeﬃcient for the constant term is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, therefore we do not ﬁnd evidence for a group shift corresponding to
a level eﬀect.
In the Deliberation treatment, the coeﬃcient for the constant remains in-
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, showing that there is no group shift corre-
sponding to a level eﬀect in this condition, either. However, besides the median
(2009) examined groups of three individuals.
13For example, both when the group decision is the mean of the expressed opinions and
when the group decision is the median of the expressed opinions, if the publicly expressed
opinion of group members diﬀers by a constant c for subjects from their secretly submitted
individual choices, the expected coeﬃcient of the constant term is c.
5individual decision, the second lowest individual decision also becomes signiﬁ-
cant in determining the group decision. The mean hypothesis is still rejected,
but in the Deliberation treatment the median hypothesis is also rejected. While
the group members with the most extreme opinions do not inﬂuence the group
decision, the group member one position away from the median in the self-
ish direction does seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. The point estimate of the
regression coeﬃcient for the second lowest individual contribution is smaller
than the estimated coeﬃcient for the median decision, but the diﬀerence is not
signiﬁcant.
We found the above ﬁndings to be robust to only including data from later
phases of the experimental sessions. That is, while subjects may change their
individual opinions throughout the experiment about possible choices, the way
individual choices get aggregated into a group choice stays constant throughout
diﬀerent phases of the experiment.
Our results provide evidence against the social comparison theory. The ﬁnd-
ing that the constant term in both conditions is insigniﬁcant, and hence no level
shift in contributions independent of the aggregation was observed, indicates
that the social setting by itself does not alter subjects’ choices in our context.
In particular, the fact that the median group member’s individual contribution
is the only signiﬁcant explanatory variable in the No Deliberation treatment
suggests that there is no group shift, if one deﬁnes group shift appropriately,
without the possibility of persuasion. On the other hand, our ﬁndings are in
line with the predictions of the persuasive argument theory. Deliberation makes
the group member with the second lowest individual contribution inﬂuential in
the group decision.
Interestingly, when regressing the group decision on the mean of the indi-
vidual decisions in the Deliberation session, the constant term in the regression
becomes signiﬁcantly negative. Hence, a researcher working with an incorrect
speciﬁcation assuming that the group decision depends on the mean of individ-
ual decisions would falsely conclude that there is a selﬁsh shift when switching
from individual to group decisions. At the same time, when regressing the
group contribution on the median individual decision, the point estimate for
the constant term is insigniﬁcant and very close to zero.
In lottery choices, we ﬁnd that in 96% of the cases the median individual
decision becomes the group decision, in both the Deliberation and the No delib-
eration treatments. In the remaining cases there is no clear pattern about the
direction of the shift in the group decision relative to the median. Nevertheless,
in all lottery choice problems in which more than 60% of individual subjects
prefer one option (either the safe or the risky one), the share of groups choosing
that option is even higher than the share of individuals choosing it, which an
analyst simply comparing average decisions of groups versus individuals would
interpret as a group shift. However, the main driving force behind the diﬀer-
ences of the average decisions of individuals and groups is that in some lottery
choice problems the median individual decision is the safe choice, even when a
signiﬁcant minority chooses the risky one, or vice versa. In the group decisions
the minority opinion tends to be oppressed, leading to a diﬀerent distribution of
6choices for groups than for individuals. The result that this eﬀect has the same
impact no matter whether the distribution of individual decisions is skewed to-
wards the safe choice or towards the risky choice provides an explanation why
previous studies found “cautious shifts” in certain lottery choice problems, while
“risky shifts” in others.
We recorded certain demographic information on subjects: gender, age, and
whether the subject is studying an economics-related ﬁeld. These characteristics
seem to have little eﬀect on how inﬂuential a person is in deliberation. The only
consistent eﬀect we found is that women, if their positions within the group
were close to the median, were somewhat more inﬂuential in the Deliberation
treatment than men. This ﬁnding is in contrast with Christensen and Abbott
(2000), who ﬁnd that women’s ideas are often less inﬂuential and sometimes
suppressed altogether in mixed-gender groups.
2 Related literature
The literature on group shifts in social psychology dates back to Stoner (1961).
Subsequent research showed that in most decision problems exhibiting a group
shift, groups tend to take more extreme decisions than individuals. That is,
in one-dimensional decisions in which the distribution of individual decisions
is skewed in one direction, group decisions tend to shift further in that direc-
tion. Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) labeled this as “group polarization”, and
risky/cautious shifts and selﬁsh shifts are regarded as particular instances of this
regularity. Sunstein (2000, 2002) and Manin (2005) point out the related phe-
nomenon of “group extremization”: even in tasks in which individual preferences
on average are not tilted in one direction, if in a particular group preferences
are more towards one direction, a group shift tends to occur in this direction.
That is, groups make more extreme decisions, although not systematically in
one direction. On the other hand, there are a few papers that found decision
problems in which deliberation leads to depolarization of opinions (Ferguson
and Vidmar, 1971; Burnstein, 1982).
There are many explanations provided in the literature for systematic group
shifts that could apply to contexts involving non-intellective tasks, besides the
two most popular lines of explanation highlighted in the Introduction. The
identiﬁability explanation (Wallach et al., 1962, 1964) claims that people in
group decisions act more selﬁshly because the other side’s ability to assign per-
sonal responsibility is more limited. The in-group versus out-group sentiments
theory (Tajfel et al., 1971; Kramer, 1991) posits that subjects develop more
other-regarding preferences toward their group members than towards subjects
outside the group.14 Eliaz et al. (2005) show that in lottery choice problems sub-
jects who are not expected utility maximizers should exhibit a group shift, given
that the choice problem associated with possibly being pivotal in a group de-
cision involving majority voting involves diﬀerent lotteries than subjects would
face as individual decision-makers.
14See also Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007).
7Less directly related to our paper is the literature on intellective tasks. In
this environment, a string of papers showed that groups tend to outperform
individuals.15 However, psychologists found several examples in which groups
are more likely to choose incorrect decisions (group members are more likely
to herd with someone arguing for a particular incorrect choice).16 Glaeser and
Sunstein (2009) provide a theoretical analysis of group shifts in the context of
intellective tasks.
3 Competing Hypotheses
We investigate situations in which ﬁve individuals ﬁrst make an individual
choice, and then jointly decide on a group choice, for the same decision problem.
The models we examine can be generally written as:
ygt = f(x1gt,x2gt,x3gt,x4gt,x5gt,Xg,t)
where t stands for a time period (which for every group is associated with one
particular decision problem), ygt is group g’s observed decision in period t, xigt
is the observed individual decision of individual i in the same period, and Xg is
a vector of characteristics of the group members, which allows for the group’s
decision to depend on observed demographic characteristics of the group. Note
that we allow the aggregation function f to depend on t. We also use x
(j)
gt to





gt are the highest and lowest, respectively.
All of our comparisons are between the individual decisions and group de-
cisions for a particular period t. In our basic speciﬁcation we assume that the
relationship between group and individual decisions - that is, how individual
decisions are aggregated to a group decision - does not depend on the particu-
lar time period. In Subsection 6.2, we provide evidence for the validity of this
assumption.
In most of the analysis we focus on models in which the group decision is
a linear function of (xigt)i=1,..,5. In particular, we omit Xg from most of the
analysis, for the reason that we found that observed demographic characteristics
of group members played little role in the aggregation. For results on how
demographic characteristics inﬂuence aggregation, see Subsection 5.2.
We focus on linear models and our basic speciﬁcation is:










gt + ǫgt. (1)
The ﬁrst hypothesis we examine, the mean hypothesis, implies that the
group’s decision is simply a function of the mean of the individual decisions.
15Kocher and Sutter (2005) conclude that groups learn faster and make better judgments in
beauty contest games. Blinder and Morgan (2005), in an experiment in which subjects were
asked to make statistical inferences in a design that mimicked certain aspects of monetary
policymaking, ﬁnd that groups consistently outperform individuals. Cooper and Kagel (2005)
show that groups play more strategically than individuals in signaling games.













That is, the mean is a suﬃcient statistic for the group’s decision. If β = 1,
then the mean exactly predicts the group’s decision. If β < 1, then the group’s
predicted decision is systematically lower than the mean of the individuals, but
there is no systematic diﬀerence which is independent of the mean decision. In
our econometric tests, we test whether we can reject the hypothesis that β1 =
β2 = β3 = β4 = β5. The version of the mean hypothesis which further requires
the mean to exactly predict the group decision, what we call the strong mean
hypothesis, involves tests of the hypothesis that β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = 1
5.
The second hypothesis, the median hypothesis, implies that the group’s




In our econometric tests, we estimate equation (??), and test whether we can
reject the hypothesis that β1 = 0,β2 = 0,β4 = 0,β5 = 0. The version of the
hypothesis which further requires the median to exactly predict the group de-
cision, what we call the strong median hypothesis, involves testing whether
we can reject both β1 = 0,β2 = 0,β4 = 0,β5 = 0 and β3 = 1.
The last hypothesis, the level-shift hypothesis, predicts that there is a
systematic shift between the group’s decision and the individual decision. The
group shift can happen relative to either to the mean decision or the median
decision. To allow either possibility, we test the level-shift hypothesis in our
main speciﬁcation by examining whether it is possible to reject the hypothesis
that α = 0. We also examine models where we only include the mean of the
individual decisions and an intercept, and models where we only include the
median of the individual decisions and an intercept and test whether we can
reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcient on the intercept is zero.
We conclude this section with relating the above simple hypotheses to the
two main theories explaining group shifts in social psychology. According to the
social comparison theory, the social setting itself alters people’s behavior and
choices. We associate this with a level-shift, corresponding to a coeﬃcient α
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (signiﬁcantly negative for a selﬁsh shift), in both
of our treatments. As opposed to this, if the social setting itself does not have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on people’s choices, we expect not to be able to reject the strong
median hypothesis and the hypothesis that α = 0. The persuasive argument
theory by design can only have an impact in the Deliberation treatment, in the
form of individual decisions in a particular direction from the median becoming
signiﬁcant determinants of the group decision, leading to the rejection of the
median hypothesis. In the No deliberation treatment we regard the testing of
the median hypothesis as a consistency check.
94 Experimental design and procedures
To test the hypotheses, our experiment utilizes decision making situations from
the two main domains of economic experiments: strategic social interaction and
non-strategic, individual decision making. We confront subjects with the choice
of a second mover in a gift-exchange game (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993),
and with a list of binary lottery choice situations as in Holt and Laury (2002).
As we elicit both individual and group choices from the same individuals over the
same decision task, our design allows us to observe the aggregation of individual
choices to group decisions.
The gift exchange game of Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) has been
widely studied in experiments on decision-making. In the version of the game
we use here, a ﬁrst mover and a second mover are each endowed with 10 tokens
of monetary value. First, the ﬁrst mover may send a gift of 0 to 10 tokens
to the second mover. The amount is deducted from the ﬁrst mover’s account,
but is tripled on the way before being awarded to the second mover. Then
the second mover can decide whether he wants to send a gift of 0 to 10 tokens
to the ﬁrst mover under the same conditions: For each token sent one token
is deducted from the second mover’s account, and the triple of the amount is
added to the ﬁrst mover’s account. While the socially optimal behavior is to
exchange maximal gifts, in the unique Nash equilibrium outcome neither player
contributes any gift.
The typical experimental data on this game shows ﬁrst movers trusting and
a signiﬁcant likelihood of reciprocal behavior among second movers, yielding
outcomes which are closer to the socially eﬃcient one. Individuals diﬀer both
in their degrees of trust as well as in their pattern of reciprocal behavior. In
our experiment we concentrate on the latter, studying how individual reciprocal
patterns are aggregated to group behavior.
For the risk choice situation, we used a version of the risk preference elicita-
tion questionnaire of Holt and Laury (2002), displayed in the Appendix of the
current paper. In this questionnaire, subjects have to make ten choices between
two lotteries, namely p[$11.50]⊕(1−p)[$0.30] vs. p[$6.00]⊕(1−p)[$4.80] with
p ∈ {0,0.1,0.2,...,0.9}. Of this choice list, one lottery is randomly selected, the
decision implemented and the corresponding lottery played out. Most experi-
ments observe heterogeneous individual risk attitudes, with a majority of people
being slightly to strongly risk averse. Our experiment studies how these indi-
vidual risk preferences are aggregated to a group risk attitude when the group
has to make a decision that applies to all members.
The experimental sessions took place from January to March 2008 in the
Computer Laboratory for Experimental Research at Harvard Business School.
We conducted four sessions with a total of 109 student subjects.
The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher,
2007). After subjects arrived instructions were distributed.17 An experimenter
(the same in all sessions) led subjects through the instructions and answered
17Instructions for the Deliberation treatment are included in the Appendix.
10open questions. Then, subjects were randomly assigned to be either one of 6
purely individual decision-makers, or to be a member of a group of 5 partici-
pants, by drawing a numbered card.
Purely individual decision-makers stayed in the main lab and made six ﬁrst-
mover decisions in a row at the beginning of the experiment, without any feed-
back. Afterwards they had to stay in the lab until the end of the session.
Group participants were led to small group rooms to make their decisions.
For them, each session consisted of three phases. Between phases, the initial
random assignment to the n groups g was reshuﬄed by assigning each group
member i to her new group g + i (mod n). During a phase groups stayed
constant. In each phase, group members made decisions as second movers in two
gift-exchange games (with two diﬀerent ﬁrst movers) and in one lottery task. In
each game, group members ﬁrst made individual decisions, after seeing the ﬁrst
mover’s gift, and submitted their decisions secretly to a researcher conducting
the experiment. Then, depending on treatment, they either freely discussed and
made a group decision, or participated in a sequential public voting mechanism
to determine the group decision.18 We refer to the ﬁrst type of session as a
Deliberation session, and the second type of session as a No Deliberation
session. After all decisions in all three phases had been made, group members
ﬁlled in a post-experimental questionnaire asking for demographic data and
containing open questions for motivations of subjects’ decisions.
There was one session with 18 groups (6 distinct groups in each of the three
phases) of the No Deliberation treatment, where the experimenters used a vot-
ing mechanism to aggregate group decisions. There were three sessions with
12, 12 and 9 groups, respectively, (in total 33) of the Deliberation treatment,
where participants in groups discussed their choice without the presence of the
experimenter. The treatment conditions, the total number of group decisions
and distinct groups are summarized in Table 1. Overall, we collected ﬁve indi-
vidual and one group choice for each of 102 gift exchange games and 510 single
choices between lotteries.
At the end of the experiment all participants were paid in cash. Units of
token money for the gift-exchange game were converted to real money at a ﬁxed
exchange rate, plus subjects received an additional ﬁxed show-up fee. Group
members earned the income from each gift exchange game and from one ran-
domly chosen out of the three lottery questionnaire choices they were involved
in. Subjects were told that for each of those choices with 50% probability one
of the individual decisions would become the eﬀective group choice, with equal
18In the voting procedure, in the gift exchange games, a researcher ﬁrst asked how many
group members would support giving at least one unit of gift to the ﬁrst proposer. Group
members were asked to raise a hand in case they supported the proposal. In case the majority
of group members supported giving at least one unit, the researcher asked the group members
how many of them would support giving at least two units. The procedure continued until a
majority indicated not supporting any higher amount of gift. For the risky choice experiment,
we solicited the number of subjects who preferred the ﬁrst choice for each of the 10 questions.
Note that since we imposed simple majority voting and the groups consisted of an odd number
of members, our design did not imply default options like in Charness and Jackson (2006)
that could potentially become a focal choice for the group.
11probability allocated to every group member’s decision, and that in this case it
would not be revealed to the group whose individual decision was chosen. With
the remaining 50% probability the group’s joint decision became the eﬀective
group choice. The average payoﬀ for purely individual and group participants
was $22.25 and $24.01 with a standard deviation of $3.55 and $4.25, respectively.
Each session lasted approximately one hour and thirty minutes.
5 Experimental ﬁndings in the gift-exchange games
5.1 Main results
Table 2 presents summary statistics about group and individual group members’
decisions. The table shows that in the No Deliberation treatment the mean of
the group decisions is 6.86 and standard deviation is 3.09, while the mean of the
group decisions in the three sessions of the Deliberation treatment is 3.11 with
a standard deviation of 3.63. The diﬀerence between the mean group decision
in the No Deliberation and Deliberation treatments can be partially accounted
for by a higher mean ﬁrst mover oﬀer of 8.46 in the No Deliberation session
versus a mean ﬁrst mover oﬀer of 7.26 in the Deliberation treatment. However,
the ratio of the ﬁrst mover’s oﬀer to the group’s decision in the deliberation
sessions is much larger than this ratio in the No deliberation session. This may
suggest that there is a diﬀerent subject pool in the No Deliberation session.
However, this does not invalidate the tests we conducted as long as the way
diﬀerent opinions get aggregated does not depend on the vector of individual
opinions (as in the mean or median hypotheses, which postulate that whatever
the individual decisions are, the group decision is the mean or the median of
individual decisions). Comparing the three deliberation sessions, the mean of
the group decisions is between 2.8 and 3.5, and the mean of the ﬁrst movers’
oﬀers are comparable across these sessions.
The next two columns of Table 2 report the mean and median of the decisions
of the ﬁve members of a group. In the No Deliberation treatment, the mean
and median of the group members’ individual decisions bracket the mean of the
group’s decisions. In contrast, in all of the Deliberation sessions, both the mean
and the median of individual decisions are larger than the group decision.
Table 3 presents estimates using data from the No Deliberation session. The
ﬁrst regression includes a constant and all ﬁve individual decisions ordered from
lowest to highest. The estimated constant is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
which is evidence against the group-level shift hypothesis. Of the ﬁve individual
decisions, only the third largest group member (the median) has a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the group’s decision at the 1% level. In addition, the group member
who made the largest individual decision has a marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect at
the 10% level. The pattern remains the same when we include ﬁxed eﬀects
for each phase of each session in the second column. The last ﬁve rows of the
table report the F-statistic and p-value for our various hypothesis tests. In both
12speciﬁcations, we reject both the mean and strong mean hypothesis with high
signiﬁcance. We cannot reject the median or strong median hypothesis, and we
do not ﬁnd support for a group-level shift.
When we aggregate the decisions of group members by computing their mean
and median for each group decision in column (3) and (5), we ﬁnd that both the
mean and median are very good predictors of the group’s decision, where the
coeﬃcient on the mean is 1.06 and the coeﬃcient on the median is 0.95. Both
regressions include a constant, which is not estimated signiﬁcantly. Columns (4)
and (6) parallel the speciﬁcations but include ﬁxed eﬀects for each phase of each
session, with almost no diﬀerence in the estimates from columns (3) and (5),
respectively. These estimates show that both the mean and median are highly
signiﬁcant, and have a coeﬃcient which is indistinguishable from 1. Finally, in
28 of our 36 observations, the median of the individual decisions is exactly equal
to the group’s decision. It is a reassuring test of our experimental setup that
the median hypothesis holds in our No Deliberation session because the session
so closely mirrors majority voting.
Table 4 presents the estimates from the Deliberation sessions pooled to-
gether, while Table 5 reports estimates for each session separately. In Table 4,
in column (1), we estimate that the second lowest and median group member
have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on the group’s decision, with the median
group member having a larger weight. When we include ﬁxed eﬀects for each
phase of each session as controls in column (2), we ﬁnd virtually no change in
the estimated coeﬃcients for the second and median group member.
In both speciﬁcations, we reject both the mean and strong mean hypothesis
with high signiﬁcance. The fact that the second group member has a reliably
signiﬁcant eﬀect across speciﬁcations also casts doubt on the median and the
strong median hypothesis. Both of these hypotheses are rejected under either
speciﬁcation (1) or (2), though the level of signiﬁcance is greater for the strong
median hypothesis.
Next, we aggregate the group members’ decisions by computing the mean
and median for each group decision. In contrast to the No Deliberation session,
we now ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two models. The estimated
coeﬃcients do not change in a signiﬁcant way when we add ﬁxed eﬀects for each
phase of each session as controls in column (4) and (6). In both speciﬁcations,
the coeﬃcient on the mean or median is statistically signiﬁcant. But in the
mean speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on the intercept is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant, while in the median speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on the intercept is
not statistically signiﬁcant.
A lower fraction of the variation is explained by the median regression in the
Deliberation session than in the No Deliberation session. In the Deliberation
session, in a lower fraction of observations, 39 out of 66, the median is exactly
the same as the group’s decision. In 41% of the observations, the individual
median is diﬀerent from the group. In most of the remaining cases, the group
decision is lower than predicted by the median. These patterns suggest that the
Deliberation treatment may add extra variance relative to the No Deliberation
treatment.
13Figure 1 presents visual evidence. The scatter plots real group decisions
over mean (black) and median (light) of individual decisions in groups in the
sessions of the Deliberation treatment. The lines in the ﬁgure are formed from
the estimates in speciﬁcations (4) and (6) in Table 4. As we observed in the
regression estimates, there is no signiﬁcant intercept in the median regression,
so the line almost goes through the origin. In contrast, the mean line is shifted.
Looking at the data for each group decision shows that if the median is extreme
(0 or 1) then the minority’s opinion does not aﬀect the group’s decision and the
majority’s opinion - that is, the median’s opinion prevails. If the median is in
between, then in a lot of cases the group decision is not the median individual
decision.
5.2 Additional speciﬁcations
5.2.1 Robustness across sessions
Table 5 investigates the robustness of our results for the Deliberation treatment
in the gift-exchange games by examining the results separately for each session.
The advantage of looking at each session separately is that it does not require
us to make assumptions about comparability across sessions. In the ﬁrst three
columns of the table, we report the estimates from the speciﬁcation where each
member of the group is ordered by their individual decision and we include a
constant. Since each session only has no more than 24 observations of group
decisions, we have limited power to estimate signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the spec-
iﬁcations. Nonetheless, we see in column (1) and (2) that the median group
member has a signiﬁcant and largest impact on the group’s decision. In Session
2, the second lowest group member has a marginally signiﬁcant impact, while
in Session 3, the second highest group member has a marginally signiﬁcant im-
pact. For the ﬁrst and second columns, we also are able to reject both the
mean and the strong mean hypothesis. In column (3), we ﬁnd that none of the
estimated coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant and we are unable to reject the equality of
the coeﬃcients at conventional levels. One reason for this is that we have 25%
fewer observations in this session than in the other sessions. Finally, in each
of the columns we cannot reject the median hypothesis, and are only able to
reject the strong median hypothesis in column (1). Despite the limited power
of these speciﬁcations, the estimates in columns (1) and (2) support the earlier
ﬁndings that the median group member is inﬂuential and the mean hypothesis
is rejected, while the estimates from all three columns do not allow us to reject
the median hypothesis.
The remaining columns of Table 5 focus on the comparison between the
two ways of aggregating preferences of the individuals in a group. We conﬁrm
the earlier ﬁndings for each of the sessions when examined separately: the mean
regression shows a signiﬁcant group level shift, while the median regression does
not. Moreover, the coeﬃcient on the mean is larger than the coeﬃcient on the
median. The estimated group shift is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in the ﬁrst and
third session, and at the 5% level in the second session.
145.2.2 Robustness across phases
Table 6 investigates the robustness of our results for the Deliberation treatment
by examining how individuals reach their group decision in the diﬀerent periods
in the experiment. This has the advantage that we can examine diﬀerences in
the aggregation to group decisions over time. During the course of the exper-
iment, an individual belongs to three diﬀerent groups, and the estimates are
reported for each of these phases. The ﬁrst two columns repeat our earlier main
speciﬁcation but only consider the ﬁrst set of groups in the experiment. We pool
across sessions leaving a total of 22 group decisions. The diﬀerence between col-
umn (1) and (2) is that column (2) includes ﬁxed eﬀects for interactions between
the session and whether it is the ﬁrst or second decision made by the group in
that phase. The pattern in column (1) mirrors our earlier ﬁndings: there is no
group level shift, the second and median group member are most signiﬁcant, a
pattern which is robust to the added controls of column (2). The mean regres-
sion in column (3) exhibits a highly signiﬁcant group level shift, while in the
median regression in column (5) there is no group shift and the coeﬃcient on
the median is exactly 1.
The speciﬁcations for the second set of decisions and the third set of decisions
largely parallel the ﬁrst set of decisions. First, the median is signiﬁcant for both
sets. For the second set of decisions, the median is the only signiﬁcant individual
decision, while for the third set of decisions, the three individuals who are at the
middle of the group are all signiﬁcant. When we allow the coeﬃcient on each of
the individual group members to vary with the phase (unreported), we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are equal across the phases. Next, in
the mean regression, we detect a group shift, which is not present in the median
regression. Taken together, the results presented in this table conﬁrm our earlier
ﬁndings, and show that the way individual decisions get aggregated into a group
decision stays the same throughout diﬀerent phases of the experiment.
5.2.3 Role of demographic characteristics
Finally, we investigate how our analysis in the Deliberation treatment depends
on the demographic characteristics of the participants. In our sessions of the
Deliberation treatment, 60% of subjects are male, 29% study an economics-
related ﬁeld, and the mean age is 22.19 Panel A of Table 7 examines how these
three characteristics are related to the individual decisions. In each column,
we report the estimate of a regression on indicators for gender and economics-
related ﬁeld, and a linear function of age. We include dummies for the ﬁrst
oﬀer in the gift exchange game, and since we have repeated observations for
each subject, we report robust standard errors. The coeﬃcient on male both
in speciﬁcation (1) and (4) is large and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient implies that
men on average contribute about 0.8 points less than women faced with the
same ﬁrst oﬀer. The coeﬃcient on the indicator for economics-related ﬁeld is
19One of the subjects in the third session did not answer the question on age in the ques-
tionnaire.
15also signiﬁcant, but at at the 10% level and implies that these subjects also
return back less.
Panel B investigates how the gender of a group member inﬂuences the weight
(s)he has on the group’s decision. The regression follows our main speciﬁcation,
but includes interactions of ordered individuals with their gender being female.
Adding these gender-speciﬁc interactions does not change our earlier pattern:
the second and median group members’ coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant and have
a large inﬂuence on the group’s decision. However, when the median group
member is a female, her value has more inﬂuence on the group’s decision than
when the median group member is male, and the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients is
highly signiﬁcant. We explored the same speciﬁcation for economics-related
subject and did not detect any statistical diﬀerences for the individual group
members.
6 Experimental ﬁndings in the lottery choices
In this section, we describe the data from the risk choice situations. Each lottery
choice experiment asks for the comparison between p[$11.50]⊕(1−p)[$0.30] vs.
p[$6.00] ⊕ (1 − p)[$4.80] as p ranges from 0 to 0.9. Since the payoﬀs from the
ﬁrst lottery choice are more variable than the payoﬀs for the second choice, we
refer to the ﬁrst choice as the risky choice and the second choice as the safe
choice.
Table 8 reports the fraction of decisions which are the risky choice as p
varies. In both the No Deliberation and Deliberation treatments, virtually no
individuals make the risky choice when the probability of the high payoﬀ of
$11.50 is small (lottery decision 1), while nearly all individuals make this lottery
choice when the probability of $11.50 is large (lottery decision 10). The group
decisions exhibit the same pattern.
In the No Deliberation session, there are 18 observations of group choices
over the lotteries yielding a total of 180 observations. For lottery decisions 1-4
and decisions 7-10, the median lottery choice of the group is always equal to the
group’s choice. There is only disagreement for the 5th and 6th lottery choice.
In particular, in only one observation of the 5th lottery choice does the median
of the individual choices and the group’s decision disagree, while there are 4
observations of the 6th lottery choice where they disagree. In 4 of these 5 cases
of disagreement, the group opts for the safe lottery even though the majority of
individual decisions are for the risky lottery.
In the Deliberation session, there are 33 observations of group choices over
the lotteries yielding a total of 330 observations. As with the No Deliberation
treatment, the median almost always predicts the group’s choice. There are
a total of 14 lottery choices, or less than 5% of the observations, where the
group’s choice diﬀers from the median of the individuals. In contrast to the No
Deliberation treatment, in 6 of these cases, the group choice is risky relative to
the median, while 8 times it is the safe choice.
The above ﬁndings suggest that for both the No Deliberation and Delibera-
16tion treatments, the median model is a good predictor of binary choice (in fact,
a perfect predictor in most of the binary choice problems in our experiments).
Nevertheless, as Table 8 shows, whenever at least 60% of individuals prefer
either the safe or the risky lottery in a particular lottery choice problem, the
share of groups choosing that lottery is even higher than the share of individuals
choosing it. Although this is primarily a consequence of the fact that the distri-
bution of median group member choices is diﬀerent from the individual choices,
a researcher comparing average individual versus group decisions might reach
a conclusion that people change their attitudes towards risk in group settings,
and in certain lottery choice problems they exhibit a cautious shift, while in
others they exhibit a risky shift.
We also investigated speciﬁcations where the group’s decision depends on the
choices made by each of the ﬁve group members, analogous to Table 3, although
the binary nature of the decision problem limits the scope of such investigation
in the lottery choice context. For example, the ﬁrst and second group member
make the same choice nearly all of the time (96% of our observations in the
No Deliberation treatment, and 91% of our observations in the Deliberation
treatment) and the fourth and ﬁfth group member make the same choice in
the vast majority of our observations (93% of the time in the No Deliberation
treatment, and 90% of the time in the Deliberation treatment), making it dif-
ﬁcult to draw ﬁrm conclusions on which group members become inﬂuential in
group decisions. Moreover, the results are driven by the very few number of
observations in which the group decision diﬀers from the median individual de-
cision. For these reasons, we regard ﬁndings from this investigation as at most
suggestive, as opposed to being conclusive.
We estimated linear probability models as well as probit regressions. In
both speciﬁcations, and in both treatment conditions, we ﬁnd that the median
group member coeﬃcient is the largest. In the No deliberation treatment in
the probit regression only the median individual decision is signiﬁcant, while in
the linear probability model the group member one position from the median
in the risky direction also becomes signiﬁcant.20 Hence, our experiments do
not yield conclusive evidence either for or against the median hypothesis in the
No deliberation treatment. The possibility that non-median members might
become inﬂuential in this treatment is created by the sequentiality of soliciting
group decisions in lottery choices: even though choosing between lotteries not
dominating each other is not an intellective task, people might try to learn what
the “correct” choice is from others’ votes. Hence, observing the distribution of
votes in earlier lottery choice problems might inﬂuence some subjects’ votes in
subsequent problems. This implies that the order in which we solicited group
decisions in the binary lottery choices may have inﬂuenced the choices of the
groups, which merits further investigation.
In the Deliberation treatment, we also ﬁnd that the the median group mem-
ber has the largest coeﬃcient, while the group members one position away from
20In the linear probability model with controls for lottery choice*phase, the estimated co-
eﬃcient on the median group member is 0.65 and the coeﬃcient on the group member who
makes a riskier choice is 0.28, both of which are highly signiﬁcant.
17the median in both directions also become signiﬁcant, with coeﬃcients that are
similar to each other in magnitudes.21
The limited variation in our lottery choice data prevents us from investigat-
ing the same formal hypothesis that we did with the gift-exchange experiments.
The study of risky choices made by individuals and groups will likely require
an experimental design that features lottery choices in which subjects have a
larger set of choices and more diversely distributed preferences.
7 Conclusion
This paper argues that deﬁning group shifts by comparing average individual
decisions to average decisions made by groups of people is a methodological
mistake. We also show that a theory according to which the median group
member’s individual decision becomes the group decision explains the data well
in the two contexts we examined if deliberation is not allowed. If deliberation is
allowed then other group members close to the median position can also become
inﬂuential in the group decision. Group members too far away from the median
position do not seem to be able to inﬂuence the group decision.
Although we do ﬁnd that deliberation can make non-median group members
inﬂuential, we think that it is important to reexamine whether there is such an
eﬀect in other contexts. If one deﬁnes group shift as the expected diﬀerence
between average individual decisions and average group decisions, then a group
shift might be detected even when according to our deﬁnition there is no shift
(the median group member’s opinion prevails). This can explain for example
why previous research found shifts in opposite directions in two decision prob-
lems involving the same kind of task. The observation that in certain lottery
choice problems groups exhibit risky shifts, while in others exhibiting cautious
shifts could be explained by the median hypothesis if in the ﬁrst type of lottery
choice problems the distribution of individual preferences was skewed towards
the risk-taking extreme, while in the other type of lottery problems they are
skewed towards the safe extreme. Finally, the possibility that in many contexts
the group shift documented by the literature might be simply explained by a
theory that the median group member’s opinion prevails is consistent with two
general observations on group shifts. One is that group shifts tend to occur in
the direction of the original inclination of the group (that is in the direction
towards which the distribution of preferences is skewed).22 The second one is
that group shifts are less likely to occur when groups tend to have roughly equal
number of individuals predisposed one way versus the other - that is when the
distribution of preferences in the subject pool is close to symmetric.23
21In the linear probability model with controls for lottery choice*phase*session, the esti-
mated coeﬃcient on the median group member is 0.36 (signiﬁcant at 1%), the coeﬃcient for
the group member who makes a risker choice than the median is 0.19 (signiﬁcant at 1%),
while the coeﬃcient for the group member who makes a less risky choice than the median is
0.13 (signiﬁcant at 10%).
22See for example Brown (1986), p210-212.
23See for example Sunstein (2000), p90.
18In future research we also plan to investigate the question of how individual
preferences get aggregated into a group decision in settings in which people are
not likely to have single-peaked preferences over choices, and hence the median
voter theorem does not apply.
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23Table 1 - Treatment Conditions
No Deliberation-treatment
18 distinct groups 33 distinct groups
Deliberation-treatment
(Session 1) (Sessions 2-4)
36 group decisions 66 group decisionsTreatment Session Group decisions
Mean of Group Median of Group
No Deliberation-Treatment 1 6.86 6.34 7.06
(3.09) (2.77) (3.17)
Deliberation-Treatment 2 3.50 3.70 3.54
(3.46) (2.53) (3.88)
Deliberation-Treatment 3 2.83 3.29 3.04
(3.63) (2.65) (3.50)
Deliberation-Treatment 4 2.94 3.74 3.94
(3.99) (2.66) (3.90)
Deliberation-Treatment 2-4 3.11 3.56 3.47
(3.63) (2.58) (3.71)
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
Table 2 - Group versus Individual Decisions 
Individual decisionsDependent variable: group decision
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
















phase FE N Y N Y N Y
R2-Adj 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.95
N 3 6 3 63 63 63 6 3 6
F, p-value
  mean  9.62, 0.00 9.72, 0.00
  strong mean 8.12, 0.00 8.22, 0.00
  median 1.27, 0.31 1.40, 0.26
  strong median 1.60, 0.20 1.70, 0.18
  group-level shift 0.95, 0.34 0.10, 0.75 0.30, 0.59
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  * denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, and *** 
at the 1-percent level. To control for time and groups, specifications (2), (4), and (6) contain phase dummies. 
Table 3 - Determinants of Group Decision from Individual Preferences (No Deliberation-Treatment)Dependent variable: group decision
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
















session * phase FE N Y N Y N Y
R2-Adj 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81
N 6 66 66 66 66 66 6
F, p-value
  mean  4.44, 0.00 3.79, 0.01
  strong mean 7.12, 0.00 7.12, 0.00
  median 2.63, 0.06 2.24, 0.09
  strong median 6.83, 0.00 5.88, 0.00
  group-level shift 0.10, 0.76 20.56, 0.00 0.02, 0.90
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  * denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-
percent level. To control for pooling of sessions, time and groups, specifications (2), (4), and (6) contain interactions of phase and 
session dummies.
Table 4 - Determinants of Group Decision from Individual Preferences (Deliberation-Treatment)Session Session Session 
234
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
intercept 0.29 -0.67 -0.37 -1.20*** 0.51 -1.42*** -0.17 -1.88** -0.41
(0.66) (0.61) (2.04) (0.49) (0.32) (0.41) (0.32) (0.88) (0.78)
lowest 0.01 0.03 0.27
(0.14) (0.18) (0.39)
second 0.25* 0.21 0.47
(0.14) (0.24) (0.30)
third 0.59*** 0.42* 0.47
(0.13) (0.23) (0.37)
fourth 0.15 0.42* 0.01
(0.12) (0.22) (0.37)
highest -0.10 0.02 0.09
(0.11) (0.09) (0.41)
mean 1.27*** 1.29*** 1.29***
(0.11) (0.19) (0.19)
median 0.85*** 0.99*** 0.85***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.14)
R2-Adj 0.90 0.91 0.79 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.74 0.69
N 2 42 41 82 42 42 42 41 81 8
F, p-value
  mean  3.67, 0.02 2.61, 0.07 0.82, 0.54
  strong mean 4.77, 0.01 4.38, 0.01 1.08, 0.42
  median 0.67, 0.58 0.95, 0.44 1.04, 0.41
  strong median 2.99, 0.05 1.66, 0.20 1.76, 0.20
  group-level shift 6.12, 0.02 2.51, 0.13 11.94, 0.00 0.28, 0.60 4.56, 0.05 0.27, 0.61
Table 5 - Determinants of Group Decision from Individual Preferences, Disaggregated by Session (Deliberation-Treatment)
Dependent variable: group decision
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  * denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level.
4
Session Session Session
23Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
intercept 0.69 -2.22*** -0.85 0.18 -1.08* 0.07 -0.53 -1.49*** 0.51
(1.23) (0.80) (0.67) (0.84) (0.55) (0.42) (0.55) (0.34) (0.31)
lowest -0.07 -0.21 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.11
(0.20) (0.26) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) (0.26)
second 0.78*** 0.85** 0.26 0.11 0.32** 0.32**
(0.27) (0.35) (0.21) (0.30) (0.12) (0.13)
third 0.47* 0.58* 0.78** 1.01** 0.35*** 0.28*
(0.24) -0.28 (0.33) (0.43) (0.11) (0.14)
fourth 0.08 0.08 -0.02 -0.10 0.28** 0.32**
(0.21) (0.24) (0.28) (0.33) (0.10) (0.11)
highest -0.21 -0.32 0.00 -0.06 0.10 0.14
(0.22) (0.27) (0.28) (0.20) (0.09) (0.08)
mean 1.35*** 1.39*** 1.26*** 1.27*** 1.35*** 1.35***
(0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09)
median 1.00*** 1.04*** 0.93*** 0.94*** 0.75*** 0.78***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
session*decision in group FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2-Adj 0.84 0.90 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.85 0.80 0.83 0.78 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.82 0.84
N 22 22 22 22 22 22  22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
F, p-value
  mean  3.01, 0.05 2.27, 0.13 1.52, 0.24 1.52, 0.26 1.36, 0.29 0.60, 0.67
  strong mean 3.85, 0.02 3.15, 0.05 2.17, 0.11 1.99, 0.16 3.68, 0.02 3.19, 0.05
  median 2.73, 0.08 1.94, 0.18 0.59, 0.63 0.29, 0.83 0.74, 0.54 0.48, 0.71
  strong median 2.69, 0.07 1.69, 0.22 0.71, 0.60 0.22, 0.92 10.07, 0.00 8.68, 0.00
  group-level shift 0.31, 0.58 7.63, 0.01 1.62, 0.22 0.05, 0.83 3.95, 0.06 0.02, 0.88 0.92, 0.35 19.56, 0.00 2.73, 0.11
Table 6 - Determinants of Group Decision from Individual Preferences, Disaggregated by Phase (Deliberation-Treatment)
Dependent variable: group decision
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  * denotes significance at the 10-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level.  Set of decisions made in first group refer to the first two group decisions made in the first part of the experiment.  The next two 
sets of columns correspond to the two decisions made by the second group and the two decisions made by the third group.
Set of decisions made in first phase Set of decisions made in second phase Set of decisions made in third phasePanel A: Gender effects on individual decisions








dummies for first_offer YYYY
R2-Adj 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.21
N 330 330 324 324














Dependent variable: group decision
Dependent variable: individual decision
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  * denotes significance at the 10-percent 
level, ** at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. All specification in Panel A 
include session*phase interactions. Specification in Panel B includes fixed effects for 
group composition and session*phase interactions.
Table 7 - Gender Effects (Deliberation-Treatment)Panel A: No Deliberation
Lottery Share of group choices
decision Individuals Groups equal to median
1 0.00 0.00 1.00
2 0.00 0.00 1.00
3 0.00 0.00 1.00
4 0.00 0.00 1.00
5 0.22 0.11 0.94
6 0.39 0.33 0.78
7 0.63 0.78 1.00
8 0.92 1.00 1.00
9 1.00 1.00 1.00
10 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Deliberation
Lottery Share of group choices
decision Individuals Groups equal to median
1 0.01 0.00 1.00
2 0.01 0.00 1.00
3 0.01 0.00 1.00
4 0.02 0.00 1.00
5 0.05 0.03 0.97
6 0.27 0.15 0.88
7 0.58 0.58 0.82
8 0.85 0.94 0.91
9 0.96 1.00 1.00
10 0.97 1.00 1.00
Share of risky choices
Table 8 - Risky Choices

































Subject #    ___________________ 
 
Decision #  ___________________ 
 
Room # ______________________ 
 
Please think about the following lottery choices.  Write down either a 1 or 2 
corresponding to choice 1 or 2 below. 
 
 
  Choice  1     Choice  2 
 
Decision 1:   $0.30 if throw of die 1-10    $4.80 if die 1-10  __________ 
   
Decision 2:   $11.50 if throw of die 1    $6 if die 1 
  $0.30  if  die  2-10    $4.80  if  die  2-10  __________ 
  
Decision 3:   $11.50 if throw of die 1-2    $6 if die 1-2 
  $0.30  if  die  3-10    $4.80  if  die  3-10  __________ 
  
Decision 4:   $11.50 if throw of die 1-3    $6 if die 1-3 
  $0.30  if  die  4-10    $4.80  if  die  4-10  __________ 
  
Decision 5:   $11.50 if throw of die 1-4    $6 if die 1-4 
  $0.30  if  die  5-10    $4.80  if  die  5-10  __________ 
  
Decision 6:   $11.50 if throw of die 1-5    $6 if die 1-5 
  $0.30  if  die  6-10    $4.80  if  die  6-10  __________ 
  
Decision 7:   $11.50 if throw of die 1-6    $6 if die 1-6 
  $0.30  if  die  7-10    $4.80  if  die  7-10  __________ 
  
Decision 8:   $11.50 if throw of die 1-7    $6 if die 1-7 
  $0.30  if  die  8-10    $4.80  if  die  8-10  __________ 
  
Decision 9:   $11.50 if throw of die 1-8    $6 if die 1-8 
  $0.30  if  die  9-10    $4.80  if  die  9-10  __________ 
  
Decision 10:   $11.50 if throw of die 1-9    $6 if die 1-9 
  $0.30  if  die  10     $4.80  if  die  10   __________ 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO PARTICIPANTS  
(For Deliberation Treatment) 
 
The instructions which we have distributed to you are only for your private information. 
During the experiment, please do not communicate with any of the other participants.  If 
you have any questions at any point during the experiment, raise your hand and the 
experimenter will help you. Also, please turn off all cell phones, mp3 players and other 
devices.   If you violate this rule, we will need to exclude you from the experiment and 
you will forfeit payment from participating in the experiment.  At the end of the session, 
we will only keep track of your ID number and your decisions for our research purposes.  
 
Objectives 
In this experiment we will ask you to make decisions that are simplified versions of 
decisions that you have to take in many real-world situations. Please think carefully about 
your decisions before making them, considering all possible choices! 
 
Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, we will randomly assign you to be either making 
decisions in isolation in the main computer lab, or making decisions in a small room with 
four other participants. You will draw a participant card with a number printed on it, 
which determines whether you stay in the main room or join one of the groups in the 
small rooms. If you join one of the small rooms, you will have to make both individual 
decisions in this experiment, and joint decisions with participants in the same room. 
 
We will ask you to make two types of decisions: participating in a gift-exchange 
situation, and making choices between lotteries. 
 
The gift-exchange situation 
There are two participants in this situation, a first proposer and a second proposer.  Those 
of you who are randomly selected to stay in the main lab will always be first proposers, 
and those of you in the small rooms will always be in the role of second proposers. In the 
gift-exchange situation, both players will be given 10 tokens (the experiment money) as 
an endowment.  The first proposer will begin by offering a split of the 10 tokens to the 
second proposer, from 0 to 10 such that if they offer the second proposer some amount X, 
the second proposer will receive 3X. The remaining 10-X tokens are kept by the first 
proposer (but they don’t get tripled). For instance, if the first proposer offers 5, (s)he will 
get to keep 5 for him(her)self and the second proposer will obtain 15.  After seeing what 
the first proposer did, the second proposer offers a split of tokens from his(her) 
endowment.  Again, if the second proposer offers some amount Y, the first proposer will 
receive 3Y (and the rest is kept by proposer 2, but it doesn’t get tripled). 
 
For example, suppose the first proposer offers 8 to the second proposer and the second 
proposer offers 7 to the first proposer.  Then the first proposer receives: 
 
  2  (from first period)   +   7 * 3 (from second period) = 23 
 and the second proposer receives: 
 
  8 * 3 (from first period) + 3 (from second period)      = 27. 
 
Lottery choices 
You will be shown a set of lottery choices (a lottery means that your prize is determined 
randomly). The set involves 10 choices, and in each of them you will be asked to choose 
between two lotteries. Participants will be asked to think about the lotteries, and then will 
be asked to select which lottery they prefer.  
 
An example of a lottery choice is the following: you are asked to make a choice between 
option 1 and option 2. Option 1 implies that your prize is determined by the roll of a 10-
sided dice, and it is $6 if the roll is 1-4, and it is $4.80 if the roll is 5-10. Option 2 also 
implies that your prize is determined by the roll of a 10-sided dice, but now it is $11.50 if 
the roll is 1-4 and $0.30 if the roll is 5-10. 
 
Sequence of events for participants in the small rooms 
The experiment will be split into three phases for you. In every phase you will have to 
make the same set of decisions, but with different people. That is, between phases we will 
take some of you to different rooms, where you will make decisions with a different 
group of participants. 
 
We start with taking you to your initial room, with four other participants and an 
experimenter assigned to the group. Then we run phase I, then regroup people, run phase 
II, again regroup people, and then run phase III. At the end of phase III you will be 
brought back to the main lab, where you will receive your payments for the experiment.  
 
In each phase you will have to play two gift-exchange situations as second proposers 
(with first proposers in the main lab), and make one set of lottery choice decisions. 
 
In the gift-exchange situations first the Experimenter announces to you how much the 
first proposer offered you in the game. Then you and your group members will be asked 
what you would choose to do in this game as second proposer if it was completely your 
decision. During this phase you and your group members cannot talk to each other (the 
Experimenter in the room will supervise this). After carefully thinking about your choice, 
each of you will have to write down your chosen counter-offer, together with your 
participant ID number (from the card you drew) to an answer sheet. You are asked not to 
show these answer sheets to other participants in the room. Once the Experimenter 
collected your individual answer sheets, he(she) leaves the room, and you and your group 
members can privately discuss what the group’s decision should be. This discussion is 
completely unrestricted, but at the end of the day you have to come up with a joint 
decision. After you reached this decision, fill out the group answer sheet, open the door 
and give it to your Experimenter. 
 
In each of the gift-exchange situations it will be randomly determined (with 50-50% 
probability) whether it is the group’s joint decision which mattered (which determined the counter-offer in the situation) or one of the individual decisions of the group 
members. In the latter case, it will be randomly determined which group member’s 
choice prevailed. We will only reveal you which decision mattered at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
The lottery choices again start with each of you in the group making your individual 
decisions. The Experimenter will be in the room during this time. Once you filled out 
your lottery choice answer sheet and wrote down your participant ID number on the 
sheet, the Experimenter collects the answer sheets and leaves the room. After this you can 
freely discuss it with your group members what the group’s decision should be in the 
lottery choices. At the end of the experiment, it will be randomly determined (with 50-
50% probability) whether it is the group’s joint decision which mattered or one of the 
individual decisions of the group members. In the latter case, it will be randomly 
determined which group member’s choice prevailed. 
 
All in all you will play 6 rounds of gift-exchange situations as second proposers, and 
make three rounds of lottery choices. In each round of the gift-exchange situations the 
first offer comes from a different participant in the main room (no group will interact  
with the same first proposer more than once). 
 
Payoffs for participants in the small rooms  
 
Your payoff in this experiment will depend on your choices, as well as on choices of 
participants you interact with. Moreover, your choices affect the payoffs of the 
participants in your room, and the participants in the main room who you interact with in 
the gift-exchange situations. All rounds of the gift-exchange situations matter, but in each 
of them only one of the counter-offer decisions count: it can be either an individual 
decision (and with some probability your decision) or the group’s joint decision. In either 
case, the decision that becomes the second offer in the game determines everyone’s 
payoff in the room in that round. At the end of the experiment we will add up the tokens 
you collected in the gift-exchange situations, and convert it to dollars using a fixed 
exchange rate. 
 
As for lottery choices, you will fill out three sets of lottery choices, one in each of the 
phases. However, only one of these will matter: it will be randomly determined at the end 
of the experiment which phase. At the same time, it will also be randomly determined 
whether from this round it is the group’s joint decision that determines lottery payoffs in 
the group, or one of the individual decisions, and if the latter then which member’s 
decision in the group. From the selected answer sheet then we will randomly choose one 
of the lottery choices (out of the ten choices), see which lottery was selected on this sheet, 
and execute that lottery. This becomes everyone’s lottery payoff from the group. 
 
Lottery prizes are specified in (real) dollar terms. 
 
Note that every choice you make is relevant with some probability: it can become the 
actual choice that determines your payoff!  
At the end of the experiment you will get a printout summarizing which decisions 
mattered and how your payoff was calculated. 
 
 
Participants in the main lab 
 
You will play six rounds of the gift-exchange situation, each time as first proposer. In 
every situation you will interact with a different group of participants in the small rooms. 
The counter-offers to your offers will only be revealed to you at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
After you made your first offer decisions, we will ask you to wait until the participants in 
the small room finished making all their decisions, since their decisions will determine 
your payoffs. 
 
Each gift-exchange situation that you participate in is relevant for your payment. The 
tokens that you collect from these situations will be converted using a fixed exchange rate 
to dollars. 
 
You will not be asked to make lottery choices in this experiment. 
 
Please wait patiently until all participants have finished reading these instructions. 